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Abstract
This article presents a cross-national comparative analysis of the relationship between different dimensions of globaliza-
tion andmodern slavery. It argues that both the economic and political dimensions of globalization are strongly associated
with lower levels of slavery prevalence. Recent estimates suggest there are more than 40 million people in some form of
slavery and the United Nations has committed the world to ending this problem by 2030. Some argue that a race to the
bottom, and the structure of economic incentives associated with globalization have contributed to the problem of mod-
ern slavery. Others argue that increased openness and the diffusion of values, the spread of democratic forms of rule, and
the advance of human rights that come with globalization limit modern slavery. This article presents a preliminary empir-
ical analysis of these arguments using data on slavery prevalence across more than 60 countries and various measures
of economic and political globalization. The analysis shows that economic measures of globalization and higher levels of
democracy are significantly related to lower levels of slavery prevalence, even after controlling for armed conflict and re-
gional differentiation. In order to support these findings, the article examines the international law on slavery, definitions
and conceptions of modern slavery, and comparative data on slavery prevalence modeled across indicators of economic
and political globalization. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the trade-offs between
globalization and modern slavery.
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1. Introduction
Globalization is a contested economic, social, and politi-
cal phenomenon whose key features include the break-
ing down of traditional territorial borders, the redefini-
tion of regions, new divisions of labour and the distribu-
tion of power, and a changing role of culture (Hermann,
2010). Its contestation varies across different sets of di-
mensions. First, there is a question as to whether it is
progressive, linear, and/or inevitable (see, e.g., LeBaron,
2016). Second, there are concerns over whether it is
a mere description of what is happening in the world
or offers a deeper causal theory of economic, social,
and political change (Landman & Carvalho, 2016; Li
& Reuveny, 2003). Third, there are arguments that it
has been ‘oversold’ as to its overall positive benefits
and importance (Held & McGrew, 2007; Held, McGrew,
Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Stiglitz, 2005, p. 229, 2017).
The post 9/11 world has certainly brought new chal-
lenges to the idea of globalization as a positive and en-
lightening force for change. Some argue that there is ev-
idence of a backlash against globalization and globalist
aspirations. This evidence includes the growth in nation-
alist movements, some interpretations of the 2016 vote
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 275–290 275
of the UK to leave the European Union, the electoral vic-
tories of decidedly nationalist politicians in the US and
Brazil, and the growing strength of right wing political
parties in France, theNetherlands, and Italy (seeNorris &
Inglehart, 2019). Various indicators of globalization show
increased inter-connectedness, economic flows of trade
and investment, high levels of popular support for differ-
ent dimensions of globalization (World Economic Forum,
2018), and until very recently (Diamond & Plattner,
2015; Diamond, Plattner, & Walker, 2016), the growth
of democracy and human rights (Held & McGrew, 2007,
p. 1; Landman, 2013). Patterns of cultural and political
diffusion have seen the third and fourth waves of democ-
ratization (Deutsch & Welzel, 2016; Doorenspleet, 2005;
Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel,
2005; Landman, 2013; Whitehead, 1996), the prolifer-
ation of human rights instruments and improved hu-
man rights enjoyment (Fariss, 2014; Landman, 2005b;
Simmons, 2009; Welzel, 2013), an ‘economic geogra-
phy of human rights’ (Edwards, Kernohan, Landman, &
Nessa, 2018), as well as a ‘justice cascade’ (Risse, Ropp,
& Sikkink, 1999, 2013; Sikkink, 2011).
Alongside these debates around the true nature and
extent of globalization and its demonstrable impact has
been renewed attention to the phenomenon of modern
slavery. Popular awareness of the problem varies, but
there has been an increase in the formal political recog-
nition of the problem at international and national levels.
United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8.7
(United Nations Development Programme, 2015) calls
for member states to ‘[t]ake immediate and effective
measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slav-
ery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and
elimination of the worst forms of child labour.’ National
governments, like the UK and Australia, are passing laws
to combat modern slavery and to hold large organisa-
tions to account for the degree to which their opera-
tions are affected by the problem. International and na-
tional non-governmental organisations (NGOs) work to
raise awareness, advocate for change, make direct inter-
ventions, and provide support for slavery survivors.
Estimates of the prevalence of slavery have varied
over the past few years, beginning with a series of calcu-
lations carried out by the Walk Free Foundation, which
estimates that in 2013 there were 29 million slaves, fol-
lowed by 36 million in 2014, and 45.8 million in 2016.
Alongside these figures for slavery, the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that those in condi-
tions of forced labour totaled 21 million, while in 2018,
the ILO and Walk Free jointly estimated the number of
slaves to be 40.3 million, a figure that includes forced
marriage and forced labour. This suggests that as an ab-
solute number there are more slaves alive today than at
earlier points in human history, but as a relative num-
ber, a lower proportion of the global population enslaved
than during earlier periods of legalised slavery. Like other
human rights problems, the phenomenon of modern
slavery suffers from the fundamental problem of un-
observability and intractability. Human rights measure-
ment efforts have included ‘standards-based’ measures
(see Landman&Carvalho, 2009) forworker rights, includ-
ing the scale developed by the Cingranelli and Richards
’HumanRights Data Project’ (Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay,
2014). Given that slavery prevalence is susceptible to dif-
ferent socio-economic, political, and cultural drivers, it is
possible to test the degree to which different attributes
of economic and political globalization are related to slav-
ery prevalence.
The key question for this article is whether there is a
trade-off between globalization and slavery. Increasingly
systematic efforts to measure and estimate the problem
of slavery show that it is indeed widespread and not iso-
lated to developing countries alone, while some have ar-
gued that the development of global capitalism and pro-
cesses of globalisation are in part to blame for the phe-
nomenon (LeBaron, 2016, p. 382). Is it possible to have in-
creased patterns of globalization without the downside
of precarious labour conditions, some of which include
modern slavery? Is slavery the ‘dark underbelly of global-
isation’ (O’Connell Davidson, 2014, p. 29) or do the bene-
fits of globalisation in terms of opening up economic and
political contexts to trade, technology, values, and mod-
els of governance actually reduce the prevalence of slav-
ery? Any attempt to begin to answer such questions re-
quires a systematic analysis of the variation in the preva-
lence of slavery to see the degree to which such varia-
tion is related to the economic and political dimensions
of globalization.
Using the 2016 and 2018 country level estimates
of slavery prevalence provided by the ILO and Walk
Free Foundation, this article provides the first systematic
cross-national analysis of the relationships between dif-
ferent dimensions of globalization and modern slavery.
Walk Free’s methodology in partnership with the Gallup
Organisation and the ILO uses survey methods to obtain
country level prevalence estimates in a number of coun-
tries, and then extrapolates these to those countries for
which there were no surveys. The extrapolation method
is contested for a number of reasons (Silverman, 2018),
and in any case does not lead to independent estimates
for the various countries. For these reasons, we use the
prevalence data for only those countries in which house-
hold surveys were administered. The total number of ob-
servations across the two years are thus 70. As a cross
check on these prevalence data, we also use the worker
protection scale developed by Cingranelli and Richards
coded from the US State Department annual country re-
ports. The coding for this variable includes: (1) the right
of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain col-
lectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of
forced or compulsive labour; (4) a minimum age for the
employment of children; and (5) acceptable conditions
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work,
occupational health and safety (Cingranelli et al., 2014,
p. 65). These data have been used, for example, in stud-
ies on structural adjustment, trade, and direct foreign in-
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vestment (see Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Neumayer
& de Soysa, 2007) and range from 0 (no worker rights
protection) to 2 (full worker rights protection).
The quantitative modelling includes independent
variables that capture the economic and political dimen-
sions of globalization that have appeared in the extant
literature on globalisation, trade, foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), democratization, and the diffusion of hu-
man rights. The results of our bivariate analysis show
that slavery prevalence is significantly lower in coun-
tries with: (1) high levels of economic development (per
capita GDP); (2) high levels of globalisation (using the
KOF Globalisation Index); (3) high levels of democracy;
(4) better records of protecting so-called ‘physical in-
tegrity rights’ (see Landman, 2005b; Landman & Larizza,
2009; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith, 1999); and
(5) countries that are not involved in some formof armed
conflict. The multivariate analysis shows that across a va-
riety of different model specifications, there are statis-
tically significant relationships between economic devel-
opment, globalisation, and democracy on the one hand,
and lower levels of slavery prevalence on the other hand,
even after controlling for the presence of armed con-
flict and regional differentiation. While this level of ag-
gregate cross-country analysis cannot, at present, be bro-
ken down into different economic sectors, nor unpack
more complicated country level processes, it does sug-
gest that globalisation itself may not be the root cause
of the problem.
To develop the argument and carry out this analy-
sis, the article has five sections. Section 2 provides a
definition of modern slavery that scholars and activists
have used to underpin prevalence estimations. Section 3
presents a number of stylised facts and descriptive statis-
tics for the measure of prevalence using the estimates
from the 2016 and 2018 Global Slavery Index (GSI) re-
ports. Section 4 discusses the data and methods used
for the analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results
and discusses the implications for understanding the
trade-offs between globalization and modern slavery.
2. Definitions of Slavery
Popular understandings of slavery often conjure up im-
ages of African slaves brought to the Caribbean, Brazil,
and the US, where such images typically include slave
ships, slaves bound in chains, and slaves auctioned at
market. Such imagery tends to obscure current reali-
ties of slavery and relegate it as a problem of the past.
Scholars ofmodern slavery (e.g., Bales, 1999, 2005, 2007;
Bales & Soodalter, 2009; Bales, Trodd, & Williamson,
2009; Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017), however, argue that slav-
ery is alive andwell and that it has taken on new forms or
updated old forms comprising a variety of practices that
include (but are not exclusive to) debt bondage, domes-
tic servitude, forced prostitution, forced labour, forced
marriage, and human trafficking (Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017,
p. 11; Cockayne, Grono, & Panaccione, 2016; Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002). These
same scholars also argue that slavery is not a ‘thirdworld’
problem or problem of the ‘global south,’ but rather one
that is truly global in reach.
As in much human rights work, international law
and norms are an excellent starting point for defin-
ing slavery. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention
(League of Nations, 1926) defines slavery as ‘the sta-
tus or condition of a person over whom any or all
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
are exercised, ’where the ideas of ownership and
property are given primacy. Additional legal develop-
ments have further articulated the definition of slav-
ery, such as the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery (Article 7a), the 1998
Rome Statute (Article 7.2.c), which established the
International Criminal Court, the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (Article 5c), the 2000 United
Nations Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in Persons and
the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings.
The Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal
Parameters of Slavery, from 2012, bring these various le-
gal strands together, both in terms of the right to owner-
ship, the powers attached to the right of ownership, and
the notion of possession. In focussing on these elements
as foundational to slavery, the guidelines emphasise the
notion of control and lack of agency for victims of slav-
ery, where different forms of coercion maintain power
over individuals and prevent them from leaving the con-
ditions of their enslavement. This denial of agency is
crucial to the definition of modern slavery and moves it
away from a strict focus on ‘property’ and ‘ownership’
to one of relative power relations, coercion, and inabil-
ity for slaves to leave their conditions of enslavement
(Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017; Cockayne et al., 2016; Landman,
2018). While ownership and selling of individuals still
takes place (e.g., the slaves traded in Northern Libya in
2017), other forms of activity associated with owner-
ship include transfer of persons, using people, managing
the use of a person, profiting from the use of a person,
transferring a person to an heir or successor, and/or
the disposal, mistreatment or neglect or destruction of
a person.
In the context of the UK, for example, the Home
Office has specified a typology of slavery with 17 differ-
ent categories across different forms of labour exploita-
tion, domestic servitude, sexual exploitation, and crim-
inal exploitation (Cooper, Hesketh, Ellis, & Fair, 2017).
In addition to this typology, the Home Office used a
Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE) approach, based on
data from various sources collated by the National Crime
Agency, to yield an estimate of 10,000 to 13,000 UK vic-
tims (Bales, Hesketh, & Silverman, 2015). Similar analysis
has been done for the Netherlands and the city of New
Orleans (Bales,Murphy, & Silverman, in press; Silverman,
in press; van Dijk, van der Heijden, & Kragten-Heerdink,
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2016). The Walk Free estimates across Europe vary from
less than 30 in Iceland to over 500,000 in the Russian
Federation. The individuals that comprise these figures
are typically found working in construction, agriculture,
domestic service, in nail bars, hair dressers, drug houses,
farms, car washes, adult parlours, and even as street per-
formers in popular tourist destinations, where the day’s
takings are confiscated by gang masters and controllers.
In each of these cases, the enslaver has some form of
control or coercion that maintains the condition of en-
slavement, while the categories of slaves vary consider-
ably across a wide range of economic sectors and mar-
kets. The nature of the enslavement means that slaves
are often hidden in plain sight, and that investigators,
the police, bank staff, health professionals, and even
passers-by can assist in the identification of slaves in or-
der for law enforcement to provide assistance and in
some cases, pursue criminal prosecution. The Bellagio-
Harvard Guidelines have therefore been a useful tool
for setting the parameters and conditions for identify-
ing modern slavery. Walk Free has adopted the Bellagio-
Harvard Guidelines as its working definition of slavery,
underpinning the GSI estimates.
3. Stylised Facts and Descriptive Statistics
In the absence of cross-nationalMSE-derived prevalence
data, we opt to use the country level estimates from the
GSI. The two versions of the GSI from 2016 and 2018
provide data on a range of variables relating to modern
slavery, including measures of vulnerability, prevalence,
and government response. This article is concerned with
explaining the cross-national variation in the prevalence
of slavery as its primary focus. The prevalence measure
is expressed as the estimated proportion of the total
population in modern slavery (%), which are produced
from mapping the vulnerability of individuals revealed
through the use of Gallup administered household sur-
veys. The estimation comes from the positive responses
to a series of questions relating to the forced nature of
work, the inability to leave, the duration of the condi-
tion, and/or the condition of forcedmarriage (ILO&Walk
Free Foundation, 2017). These questions are in line with
the content of the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines for the
Legal Parameters of Slavery discussed above. For forced
labour, the questions focus on the immediate family net-
work, the presence of forced labour experience by any-
one in the immediate family, who this person is (includ-
ing their age and sex), when and for how long the condi-
tion lasted, the country in which it took place, the type
of work that the person was forced to do, and the means
of coercion that was used (ILO & Walk Free Foundation,
2017, p. 52). The fact that the surveys are administered
to a random sample of households allows the estimation
to be made as to the prevalence of forced labour and
forcedmarriage as a percentage of thewhole population.
We use the prevalence measure only for those countries
where Gallup conducted a household survey on behalf of
Walk Free (Silverman, 2018;Walk Free Foundation, 2016;
Walk Free Foundation & ILO, 2018). Observational inde-
pendence is a crucial assumption of statistical analysis
so we chose data based on actual household surveys car-
ried out. Walk Free used surveys from 25 countries in
2016 and 45 countries in 2018. Our data set thus has 70
total observations and provides enough degrees of free-
dom (DF) for the analysis we conduct here. There were
22 countries where surveys were carried out for both
the 2016 and the 2018 exercises. Because these surveys
were independent, each such country is included twice
in the data set.
The GSI tends to focus on a global map of prevalence
and single-country case studies and discussion; however,
it is equally important to examine the overall distribu-
tion of prevalence for the observations in our sample
to provide additional insights into the nature and ex-
tent of modern slavery. Figure 1 shows a histogram of
slavery prevalence for those countries where Walk Free
and Gallup administered a household survey, putting to-
gether the 2016 and 2018 samples. The histogram is con-
structed on a logarithmic scale and it can be seen that
the logarithms of prevalence follow a relatively normal
distribution. The median value of prevalence is 0.46%,
the lower and upper quartiles 0.26% and 0.77%, and
the extreme values 0.08% and 2.22%. In addition to this
estimation of prevalence, the Cingranelli and Richards
Human Rights Data Project has coded worker rights pro-
tection from a close reading of US State Department an-
nual country reports. The scale ranges from 0 (no worker
rights protection) to 2 (strong worker rights protection),
where it is clear that the most countries are grouped
around 0 and 1 with a small number of countries receiv-
ing a score of 2. Figure 2 shows a histogram for the CIRI
worker rights protectionmeasures, where the limited na-
ture of the variable shows strong country clustering for
the 0 and 1 scores. There is a weak correlation between
these two measures (r = −0.20; p < 0.10), where the
mean prevalence level for each value of the scale are
as follows: 0.66 for countries coded 0, 0.58 for those
coded 1, and 0.35 for those coded 2. TheGSI estimate is a
more directmeasure of prevalence than the CIRI variable,
which includes forced labour alongside other dimensions
of worker rights protection. We thus specify the esti-
mated prevalence of slavery as our dependent variable.
4. Modelling Globalization and Slavery
This article tests the relationship between different indi-
cators of globalization and slavery prevalence. There are
indeed micro foundations for slavery, which are based
on (1) instrumental rationality, market conditions and
the structure of incentives; (2) criminality and deviance;
(3) cultural framings and inter-subjective understandings
(Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2017) and household and community
relations (International Organisation forMigration [IOM],
2018). The level of analysis presented here, however, fo-
cuses on aggregate measures of slavery and how they re-
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Figure 2. Histogram of worker rights protection.
late to different dimensions of globalization. There have
been earlier and related attempts to examine the rela-
tionship between globalization and forced labour. For ex-
ample, Manzo (2005a, 2005b) examined the processes
of uneven development and trafficking, slavery among
children, and ‘deproletarianisation’ in West Africa, with
a particular focus on media reports in Côte d’Ivoire.
LeBaron and Ayers (2013) examine the relationship be-
tween neo-liberalism (for many the dominant economic
model of globalization) and modern slavery in Africa,
where they link labour market reform and privatisation
with the rise of ‘unfree’ labour. Jian and LaFree (2017) ex-
amine the relationship between trade openness and hu-
man trafficking, finding that countries making the transi-
tion between lowandhigh levels of trade openness strug-
gle to avoid increased levels of trafficking. Finally, and
most related to the analysis presented here, Neumayer
and de Soysa (2007) analyse the relationship between
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trade openness and FDI on the one hand with women’s
rights and the protection of labour rights on the other, us-
ing the CIRI worker rights protection scale as their main
dependent variable. Across a cross-section of 166 coun-
tries, they find that trade openness is positively related
to better protection of women’s economic rights and
worker rights, alongside additional variables such as over-
all levels of development and democracy.
Drawing on these earlier studies and the work on
globalization more generally, we derive a number of ob-
servable implications that we examine empirically. On
the positive side, it is argued that there are a number
of plausible tangible benefits to globalization that stem
from countries opening up their economic and political
systems to the influences of trade, technology transfer,
and the diffusion of values. Participation in the economic
dimensions of globalization can have a positive impact
on economic development, which in turn can lead to
value change and the embrace of systems of governance
that adhere to democratic principles and the protection
of human rights (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel,
2005; Welzel, 2013). The work on the ‘Kantian Peace’
shows that increased trade, the advent of ‘civic republi-
can’ systems of governance (read democracy and human
rights), and increased participation in global governance
regimes (however weak they might be) can significantly
reduce the probability of ‘militarised disputes’ (Russett &
O’Neal, 2001),which in turn are related to the problemof
modern slavery. Overseas development assistance and
trade can also lead states to participate in the interna-
tional regime for the promotion andprotection of human
rights (Landman, 2005a; Simmons, 2009; Smith-Cannoy,
2012). On this view, globalization ought to be good for
combatting slavery and should be related to lower levels
of slavery prevalence.
On the negative side, it is argued that the process of
globalization is uneven, creates inequalities, and varies in
its impact across different economic sectors and across
the quality of democracy and the protection of hu-
man rights (O’Connell Davidson, 2014; LeBaron, 2016).
For these arguments, economic globalization through in-
creased trade and economic flows leads to the concen-
tration of wealth within and between countries in ways
that have differential impact on labour, marginalised
peoples, and local communities. Capital-intensive extrac-
tive industries, labour-intensive manufacturing, textiles,
fishing and other industries that comprise the contours
of economic globalization bring with them structural in-
equalities, the proliferation of and complexity in sup-
ply chains, potential opportunities for labour exploita-
tion, and the kinds of economic precarity and vulnerabil-
ity that can lead to individuals falling into modern slav-
ery. In addition, the growth of democracy and human
rights protection can show great variation within and be-
tween countries, where varying degrees of state capac-
ity and the quality of political institutions do not deliver
on their promise, with pockets of dysfunctional delibera-
tion, the persistence of informal and formal patron-client
networks, and long term impunity and lack of account-
ability for human rights violations (see, e.g., Foweraker
& Treviso, 2016; Landman, 2013).
These contending views on the effects of globalisa-
tion remain theoretically ambiguous, and thus as a first
step, it is helpful to engage in the kind of empirical analy-
sis presented here. The availability of the GSI allows for
a new analysis of these relationships with a different
form of data (prevalence) on a more direct understand-
ing of the most extreme form of exploitation. The con-
cept that underpins the derivation of the prevalence
measure is rooted in international human rights law and
the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters
of Slavery. This study thus adopts the research design
approach used in Neumayer and de Soysa (2007) and
Jian and LaFree (2017), namely, a cross-sectional analysis
of globalization and modern slavery across a reasonably
large selection of countries (n= 70). This kind of research
design has been popular in studies of other human rights
problems (seeMitchell &McCormick, 1988), where data
sets progressed from single time cross-section analysis
to the use of pooled cross-section time series structures
(see Landman & Larizza, 2009; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe
et al., 1999). There are not the data available to achieve
this latter form of data structure, but our global sample
of countries provides enough preliminary DF for useful
analysis to illustrate the potential trade-offs associated
with globalization and the problem of modern slavery.
The starting point for this macro-model is to under-
stand that the phenomenon of modern slavery at first
blush appears to be a wholly economic phenomenon;
however, the anti-slavery and anti-trafficking movement
argues that there are larger social, political, and cul-
tural dimensions and ‘determinants of vulnerability’ that
make individuals more likely to fall into slavery. The IOM
argues that in addition to the individual determinants
of vulnerability, there are family, community, and larger
structural factors that when combined raise the probabil-
ity that any one individual will fall into slavery or be traf-
ficked (IOM, 2018, pp. 5–8). At the micro level, there are
a series of socio-economic factors that can increase the
probability of any individual to be trafficked or fall into
slavery, while at the structural level, factors include poor
governance, absence of accountability mechanisms, and
weak rule of law, as well as long term stable economic
factors (IOM, 2018, p. 7). This combination of economic
and political factors is at the heart of the analysis pre-
sented in this article, which aligns with studies that seek
to explain the variation in other human rights issues (see,
e.g., Edwards et al., 2018; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988;
Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).
Across these previous studies, variables such as per
capita GDP and income and land inequality are stan-
dard economic measures (see Landman & Larizza, 2009),
while those interested in the economic interaction be-
tween countries include variables such as FDI (see Janz,
2018). For its focus on the economic dimensions of glob-
alization, the article uses several different variables. First,
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it uses World Bank data on per capita GDP as a measure
of the level of overall economic development. Second,
it uses the full KOF Globalisation Index (de facto and
de jure) as a composite measure of globalisation (see
Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, & Sturm, 2019; Potrafke, 2015).
Third, it uses FDI as a percentage of total annual GDP for
the period 2006–2017. The reason for calculating the ra-
tio of FDI and GDP over this longer period is that the an-
nual figures for FDI are extremely volatile. Fourth, it uses
‘trade openness’, which is expressed as the total value
of import and exports as the percentage of annual GDP
(see Jiang & LaFree, 2017; Neumayer & de Soysa, 2007;
Squalli &Wilson, 2011), and is one component of the KOF
Globalisation Index. The bivariate analysis reported be-
low shows that these variables are highly correlatedwith
one another and feature across different model specifi-
cations estimated through multivariate analysis. For the
political elements of globalization, the article uses three
different measures, one for democracy and two for hu-
man rights. First, it uses the ‘Liberal Democracy’ mea-
sure for 2016 drawn from the Varieties of Democracy
Project (see Coppedge, Lindberg, & Skaaning, 2015). The
scale ranges from 0 (low democracy) to 1 (high democ-
racy). Second, it uses two different measures that are
part of the Political Terror Scale. Both of them rate coun-
try human rights performance with respect to personal
integrity rights (i.e., state violation of arbitrary deten-
tion, disappearance, torture, and extra-judicial killing)
and are based on the Amnesty International annual re-
ports (PTSAI) and the US State Department annual re-
ports (PTSSD). The scales range from 1 (low violation of
human rights) to 5 (high violation of human rights; see
Poe & Tate, 1994).
In addition to economic and political globalization,
there are two further factors to take into account: armed
conflict and regional differentiation. It is important to
consider these two factors as controls, which may ac-
count for additional variation in the prevalence of mod-
ern slavery. Studies on modern slavery have linked its
presence to armed conflict, where increased political in-
stability, violence, and displacement and migration in-
crease the chances that vulnerable populations will fall
into some form of slavery, including child soldiers and
human trafficking (Freedom Fund, 2016). Refugees and
‘people on the move’ can become unwittingly drawn
into large criminal networks that move them from sites
of conflict to safer havens and recipient countries with
strong welfare systems to provide support. Once they
have migrated, however, they can find themselves in
modern forms of indentured servitude, where their pass-
ports are withheld and they engage in a variety of forms
of economic activity from which they cannot escape.
These patterns are complemented with child and female
sexual exploitation and trafficking, as well as recruitment
networks enslaving children to fight in armed conflict.
The example of Libya in 2017 showed how the civil con-
flict between rival factions produced an open slave mar-
ket inwhich youngmales are being sold. Armed conflict is
coded as a simple dummy variable (i.e., 1 for armed con-
flict, 0 for no armed conflict) for all conflict types from
the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP).
Finally, the geographical distribution of slavery is
not uniform. Rather, it is highly skewed across coun-
tries such as India and Bangladesh in Asia; Mauritania
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa;
and Colombia in South America (GSI, 2016). There is un-
doubtedly some regional clustering in the prevalence of
modern slavery, where, like other human rights prob-
lems cross-border diffusion underpins these observa-
tions (see Edwards et al., 2018). Themodel thus includes
a series of regional dummy variable using World Bank
categories for Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Russia and
Eurasia, which have the highest levels of slavery preva-
lence. Table 1 lists these variables, their description, and
their sources.
As the data set for this article are for a cross-section
of countries, estimation of the parameters of the model
is a straightforward process using a series of ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression models. The sample size
of countries provides enough DF for the inclusion of the
different independent variables. Table 2 shows the de-
scriptive statistics for all the main variables in the model
(excluding the regional dummy variables), including the
total number of observations (N), the minimum value,
Table 1. Variables and data used in the analysis of slavery prevalence.
Variable Name Description Source
EPSRAW Estimated prevalence of Slavery 2016, 2018 GSI 2016, 2018
CIRIRWRP Worker Rights Protection Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data
KOFTOTAL KOF Globalisation Index Gygli et al. (2019)
TRADE Trade Openness World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
FDI FDI as a percentage of GDP, (mean 2007–16). World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
PCGDP Per capita GDP, 2016 World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
VDEM2016 Level of liberal democracy, 2016 Varieties of Democracy
PTSAI Physical Integrity Rights Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)
PTSSD Physical Integrity Rights Political Terror Scale (US State Department)
ARMEDCON Armed Conflict (including internal) Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP)
REGION Regional categorical variable World Bank World Development Indicators (2018)
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Name Description N Min. Max. Mean Median
EPSRAW Estimated prevalence of slavery, 2016, 2018 70 0.08% 2.22% 0.60% 0.46%
CIRIWRP Worker Rights Protection 70 0 2 .61 1
KOFTOTAL KOF Globalisation Index 70 38.57 84.2 61.70 61.89
TRADE Trade Openness 70 21% 310% 77% 64.9%
FDI FDI as a percentage of GDP (mean 2007–2016)1 70 0.34% 20.14% 4.54% 2.%
PCGDP Per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 20162 70 320 51880 5398 3580
VDEM2016 Level of liberal democracy, 2016 70 0.11 0.78 0.40 0.45
PTSAI Political Terror Scale (Amnesty) 70 1 5 3.06
PTSSD Political Terror Scale (State Department) 70 1 5 3.04
ARMEDCON All armed conflict 70 0 1 0.34
Notes: 1The ratio is calculated over the period 2006–2017; 2The data are for 2016, but indexed to USD in 2010.
themaximumvalue, themean, and themedian.Medians
are given for variables on continuous scales. For those
variables with very skewed distributions, the logarithm
of the variable gives a reasonably symmetric distribution,
and is therefore used for the analysis.
5. Findings
This section of the article examines the second-order re-
lationships between the prevalence of slavery and the
other variables. Table 3 is a correlation matrix of all
the variables with the exception of the regional vari-
able. Reading down the first column shows that the
prevalence of slavery is significantly correlated with
worker rights protection, the overall level of globalisa-
tion, democracy, human rights, economic development,
human rights and armed conflict. First, the correlation
between slavery prevalence andworker rights protection
is the weakest of the correlations. Second, higher levels
of globalisation and economic development—PCGDP—
are associated with lower levels of slavery prevalence.
Third, higher levels of democracy and greater protection
of human rights are associated with lower levels of slav-
ery prevalence. Third, the presence of armed conflict is
associated with higher levels of slavery prevalence. The
second column on worker rights protection shows that
the correlations are very similar as those in the first col-
umn, but have a smaller magnitude and lower level of
significance. Column three shows the strong correlations
for all the main variables and globalisation. The strong
correlation between the level of economic development
(r = 0.86, p < 0.001) is not surprising and will be taken
into account in the multivariate analysis to address the
problem of multicollinearity. Equally, the strong correla-
tions for trade and FDI are not surprising since they are
components of the KOF globalisation index.
As this article is primarily interested in the rela-
tionship between globalisation and slavery prevalence,
Figure 3 is a scatterplot for the KOF Globalisation Index
and the prevalence of slavery (logged). It is clear from the
figure that those countries with a higher level of global-
isation (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Latvia) have a much
lower level of slavery prevalence, while those with a
much lower level of globalisation (e.g., Afghanistan, The
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Pakistan) have a
much higher level of slavery prevalence. The notable out-
lier in the figure is Brazil, which has relatively lower level
of globalisation and a lower level of slavery prevalence.
Figure 4 shows this overall relationship as smoothed line
with a 95% confidence interval, which captures its mag-
nitude and significance. Both figures suggest that the re-
lationship warrants further exploration that controls for
other possibly confounding factors.
Moving beyond these bivariate relationships, we con-
ducted a series of multivariate regression models for all
the main variables, where slavery prevalence (logged) is
Table 3. Correlation matrix of all variables.
Ln(EPSRAW) CIRIWRP KOFTOTAL Ln(TRADE) Ln(FDI) Ln(PCGDP) VDEM2016 PTSAI PTSSD
CIRIWRP −0.20* —
KOFTOTAL −0.59*** 0.26** —
Ln(TRADE) −0.15 0.19 0.50*** —
Ln(FDI) −0.18 0.04 0.40*** 0.62*** —
Ln(PCGDP) −0.64*** 0.26** 0.86*** 0.29** 0.27** —
VDEM2016 −0.56*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.06 −0.02 0.54*** —
PTSAI 0.48*** −0.18 −0.50*** −0.52*** −0.38*** −0.42*** −0.49*** —
PTSSD 0.47*** −0.27** −0.63*** −0.57*** −0.42*** −0.59*** −0.49*** 0.78*** —
ARMEDCON 0.45*** −0.32** −0.38*** −0.51*** −0.30*** −0.34*** −0.51*** 0.74*** 0.73***
Notes: Pearson’s r. Significance levels are denoted: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
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Figure 4. KOFGlobalisation Index and slavery prevalence (logged): polynomial smoothed linewith 95% confidence interval.
the dependent variable in order to understand the rela-
tive magnitude and significance of the relationships for
our main independent variables of interest. Table 4 re-
ports the results of our analysis for all the main variables.
The table is broken into two main parts: one for models
using democracy as an independent variable alongside
the KOF Globalisation Index and the level of economic
development, and the other for the two human rights
scores as independent variables. Additional controls in-
clude armed conflict and three regional dummy variables
for those regions where slavery prevalence is the high-
est. Since armed conflict is significantly correlated with
human rights, it is excluded from the human rights mod-
els. The different combination of variables yields 12mod-
els overall.
Reading across the first row of the table shows that
the KOF Globalisation Index is significantly related to
lower levels of slavery prevalence for all the models in
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Table 4.Multivariate regression estimates for globalisation and slavery prevalence.
Democracy Models Human Rights Models
Ind. Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
KOFTOTAL −0.03*** −0.02** −0.03*** −0.03*** −0.02*** −0.03***
(.006) (.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Ln(PCGDP) −0.35*** −0.26*** −0.39*** −0.42*** −0.32*** −0.35***
(.07) (.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
VDEM −1.19** −1.05* −0.88* −0.75
(.53) (.55) (.51) (.52)
PTSAI 0.18** 0.10 0.18** 0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
PTSSD 0.12 0.04 −0.10 0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
ARMEDCON 0.24 0.19 0.28 0.22
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Region
Asia 0.54** 0.51** 0.58∗∗ 0.64** 0.51** 0.60**
(0.21) (0.19) (0.08) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)
Russia-Eurasia 0.23 0.22 0.50* 0.56* 0.40 0.48*
(0.19) (0.21) (0.30) (0.31) (0.28) (0.29)
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.42** 0.35** 0.42* 0.43* 0.33 0.37**
(0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
Constant 1.22*** 0.26 2.24*** 1.27** 0.52 0.86 0.02 0.28 1.83** 2.27** 1.23 1.60*
(0.40) (0.49) (0.53) (0.48) (0.62) (0.73) (0.70) (0.80) (0.71) (0.21) (0.78) (0.90)
R2 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.47
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Notes: Dependent Variable: Natural log of estimated slavery prevalence. Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001. Method of estimation: OLS.
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which it is included, while the same is true for the level
of economic development. This suggests that countries
with a higher level of globalisation or economic develop-
ment have lower levels of slavery prevalence. The results
show that countries with higher levels of democracy also
have lower levels of slavery prevalence. The inclusion of
regional dummy variables shows that slavery prevalence
is consistently higher in Asia relative to the rest of the
world, with varying degrees of significance for Russia and
Eurasia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its significance
in our bivariate modelling (see Table 3), armed conflict
does not appear to have a significant relationship with
slavery prevalence across any of the models. The R2 val-
ues for the models in the table show that these models
explain between 34% and 56% of the variation in slav-
ery prevalence.
6. Summary and Implications
Since it first gained global attention in the late 1990s,
modern slavery has increased in salience as a public
policy problem and as an intractable problem of devel-
opment. This saliency has come from a growing recog-
nition within government and as the result of advo-
cacy from NGOs and anti−slavery activists. It is a per-
sistent problem despite its legal abolition and a prolif-
eration of anti−slavery laws, policies, and programmes.
Our aim in this article has been to understand and ex-
plain the variation in slavery prevalence across a sam-
ple of countries with respect to different dimensions
of globalization. We have been motivated by the ques-
tion as to whether there is a dark side to globalization,
which includes the emergence and maintenance of pre-
carious labour conditions and modern slavery. We set
out the contending arguments for the possible relation-
ships between slavery prevalence on the one hand and
the economic and political dimensions of globalization
on the other. We used slavery prevalence data on those
countries in which the Walk Free Foundation in part-
nership with Gallup developed a battery of questions in
household surveys. Walk Free deployed these surveys
to over 70,000 respondents that captured vulnerability
to modern slavery. Their work grounds itself concep-
tually in the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal
Parameters of Slavery. These estimates were then cross-
checked against the Cingranelli and Richards scale for
worker rights protection.
The descriptive analysis shows clearly that the dis-
tribution of slavery is highly variable across the coun-
tries in the sample. The bivariate relationships show that
there are statistically significant correlations between
prevalence of slavery and worker rights protection, the
overall level of globalisation, economic development,
and democracy. These findings were further borne out
by our multivariate regression results, which show that
globalisation, economic development, and democracy
all have significant relationships with slavery prevalence,
and that these models explain a decent range of varia-
tion in slavery prevalence. One interpretation of these
results is that is that globalised and/or richer countries
have more resources, greater state capacity, and are
more engaged with the global community in ways that
mean that slavery prevalence is significantly lower. On
our reading, it is thus too early to lay the blame for mod-
ern slavery at the feet of globalisation. As our sample
of countries is quite conservative and only available for
a limited amount of time means that draw this conclu-
sion with some caution. Further research needs to un-
pack the dimensions of the empirical generalizations re-
ported here. Breaking the data down by sector and for
those industries that produce tradeable goods, for exam-
ple, could possibly differentiate these relationships fur-
ther. Tradeable goods are increasingly subject to interna-
tional scrutiny that may limit the degree to which their
production involves modern slavery, while domestic pro-
duction of non-tradeable goodsmaywell have higher lev-
els of modern slavery and are not subject to such inter-
national scrutiny.
Our findings for democracy may relate in part to
countries in the sample being part of the recent ‘waves’
of democratization, the pace and contours of which
include elements of international diffusion and conta-
gion (Edwards et al., 2018; Whitehead, 1996). For exam-
ple, Chile is in our sample, a country that experienced
prolonged authoritarian under the Pinochet regime be-
tween 1973 and 1988, when it made a transition to
democracy. Brazil and Argentina are also transitional
cases after period of authoritarian rule during the period
from the mid−1960s to the mid−1980s. Mongolia and
Mexico are also transitional countries (1991 and 2000,
respectively). The sample also contains ex−communist
countries such as the Poland and Hungary, which for the
years of our sample have relatively high levels of democ-
racy compared to other countries. As Amartya Sen (1994)
has noted about the absence of famine in democracies,
the electoral survival of leaders depends in part on being
responsive and attendant to the needs of the voting pub-
lic; a condition that lowers the probability of total govern-
ment neglect and may explain why we see lower levels
of slavery prevalence across the democracies in the sam-
ple. The one exception may be India, which has a long-
standing tradition of democracy andhigh levels of slavery
prevalence, although its liberal democracy score is lower
than the other democracies in the sample.
Taken together, these findings mark out a new di-
rection in the cross−national analysis of modern slav-
ery. The fight against slavery is now embedded in the
United Nations SDGs, and the results here suggest that
the pursuit of other SDGs alongside 8.7 (particularly SDG
16 on peace, justice and strong institutions) will com-
plement and enhance the world’s ability to address the
problem of modern slavery. We show that there may not
be a trade-off between globalization and modern slav-
ery. Rather, we show that slavery prevalence is much
lower in those countries that are more globalised and
wealthier, and those that have higher levels of democ-
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racy. Globalization is not amonolithic global process that
necessarily creates conditions for modern slavery. These
findings suggest that the pursuit of sustainable devel-
opment and the establishment of inclusive and demo-
cratic institutions can help in the struggle to end mod-
ern slavery.
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Appendix
Country YEAR REGION ASIADUM SSADUM READUM KOFTOTAL CIRIWRP EPSRAW EPS2016R EPS2018R TRADE FDI FDI0716 VDEM2016 PTSAI PTSSD PCGDP ARMEDCON1 LNEPS LNTRADE LNFDI LNPCGDP
1 Afghanistan 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 38.57 1 2.22 NA 2.22 55.92 0.48 0.0057 0.24 5 5 570 1 0.797507 4.023922 −5.16729 6.345636
2 Argentina 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 63.02 1 0.13 NA 0.13 26.12 0.59 0.0186 0.61 2 2 11970 0 −2.04022 3.262701 −3.98459 9.390159
3 Armenia 2018 RUSSIA AND 0 0 1 67.09 1 0.34 NA 0.34 75.92 3.21 0.0515 0.23 3 3 3770 0 −1.07881 4.32968 −2.96617 8.23483
EURASIA
4 Bangladesh 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 45.54 0 0.95 0.95 NA 37.95 1.05 0.0124 0.16 4 4 1330 1 −0.05129 3.63627 −4.39006 7.192934
5 Bolivia 2016 AMERICAS 0 0 0 57.74 1 0.44 0.44 NA 56.4 1.54 0.0287 0.4 1 3 3070 0 −0.82098 4.032469 −3.55086 8.029433
6 Botswana 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 56.22 0 0.52 NA −0.16 97.13 0.83 0.0374 0.58 2 2 6750 0 −0.65393 4.57605 −3.28608 8.817298
AFRICA
7 Botswana 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 56.52 0 0.36 0.36 −0.16 97.13 0.83 0.0374 0.58 2 2 6750 0 −1.02165 4.57605 −3.28608 8.817298
AFRICA
8 Brazil 2016 AMERICAS 0 0 0 59.64 1 0.08 0.08 NA 24.57 4.34 0.0351 0.57 4 3 8840 0 −2.52573 3.201526 −3.34955 9.087042
9 Cambodia 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 57.89 0 1.65 1.65 1.68 126.95 11.43 0.1148 0.11 3 2 1140 0 0.500775 4.843793 −2.16456 7.038784
10 Cambodia 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 56.67 0 1.68 1.65 1.68 126.95 11.43 0.1148 0.11 3 2 1140 0 0.518794 4.843793 −2.16456 7.038784
11 Cameroon 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 48.08 0 0.69 NA 0.69 42 2.06 0.0182 0.17 4 3 1400 1 −0.37106 3.73767 −4.00633 7.244227
AFRICA
12 Chile 2016 AMERICAS 0 0 0 77.13 1 0.15 0.15 0.08 55.51 4.95 0.0846 0.76 2 2 13540 0 −1.89712 4.016563 −2.46982 9.513404
13 Chile 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 74.14 1 0.08 0.15 0.08 55.51 4.95 0.0846 0.76 2 2 13540 0 −2.52573 4.016563 −2.46982 9.513404
14 Colombia 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 61.68 1 0.27 NA 0.27 36.47 4.94 0.0404 0.52 3 3 6310 1 −1.30933 3.59649 −3.20893 8.749891
15 Czech Republic 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 83.41 1 0.13 NA 0.13 151.6 5.56 0.0384 0.78 1 1 17540 0 −2.04022 5.021245 −3.2597 9.77224
16 Democratic 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 41.14 1 1.37 NA 1.37 59.59 2.35 0.0574 0.12 5 5 430 1 0.314811 4.087488 −2.85771 6.063785
Republic of AFRICA
the Congo
17 Egypt 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 60.87 0 0.55 NA 0.55 30.02 2.44 0.0244 0.17 4 4 3410 1 −0.59784 3.401864 −3.71317 8.134467
NORTH AFRICA
18 Ethiopia 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 43.67 0 0.41 0.41 0.61 35.51 5.46 0.0272 0.12 4 5 660 1 −0.8916 3.569814 −3.60454 6.49224
AFRICA
19 Ethiopia 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 42.51 0 0.61 0.41 0.61 35.51 5.46 0.0272 0.12 4 5 660 1 −0.4943 3.569814 −3.60454 6.49224
AFRICA
20 Georgia 2018 RUSSIA AND 0 0 1 72.5 0 0.23 NA 0.23 102.93 11.04 0.0968 0.55 2 2 3830 0 −1.46968 4.634049 −2.33511 8.25062
EURASIA
21 Ghana 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 61.03 1 0.38 0.38 0.48 89.34 8.14 0.0696 0.55 2 3 1380 0 −0.96758 4.492449 −2.66499 7.229839
AFRICA
22 Ghana 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 55.83 1 0.48 0.38 0.48 89.34 8.14 0.0696 0.55 2 3 1380 0 −0.73397 4.492449 −2.66499 7.229839
AFRICA
23 Guatemala 2016 AMERICAS 0 0 0 63.09 0 0.84 0.84 0.29 47 1.71 0.0211 0.48 2 3 3790 0 −0.17435 3.850147 −3.85848 8.240121
24 Guatemala 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 63.17 0 0.29 0.84 0.29 47 1.71 0.0211 0.48 2 3 3790 0 −1.23787 3.850147 −3.85848 8.240121
25 Haiti 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 47.33 0 0.55 NA 0.55 73.34 1.32 0.0145 0.31 2 3 780 0 −0.59784 4.295106 −4.23361 6.659294
26 Honduras 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 61.71 0 0.33 NA 0.33 100.49 5.3 0.0612 0.33 3 3 2150 0 −1.10866 4.610058 −2.79361 7.673223
27 Hungary 2016 EUROPE 0 0 0 83.13 1 0.23 0.23 0.26 168.99 55.49 0.1594 0.57 2 2 12570 0 −1.46968 5.129839 −1.83634 9.439068
28 Hungary 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 84.2 1 0.26 0.23 0.26 168.99 55.49 0.1594 0.57 2 2 12570 0 −1.34707 5.129839 −1.83634 9.439068
29 India 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 61.18 1 1.4 1.4 0.61 40.35 1.95 0.0199 0.47 4 4 1670 1 0.336472 3.697591 −3.91704 7.420579
30 India 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 56.77 1 0.61 1.4 0.61 40.35 1.95 0.0199 0.47 4 4 1670 1 −0.4943 3.697591 −3.91704 7.420579
31 Indonesia 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 62.97 0 0.29 0.29 0.47 37.44 0.49 0.0197 0.48 3 3 3400 0 −1.23787 3.62274 −3.92714 8.131531
32 Indonesia 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 62.04 0 0.47 0.29 0.47 37.44 0.49 0.0197 0.48 3 3 3400 0 −0.75502 3.62274 −3.92714 8.131531
33 Jordan 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 74.31 0 0.19 NA 0.19 91.32 4.02 0.0674 0.23 3 3 3920 1 −1.66073 4.51437 −2.69711 8.273847
NORTH AFRICA
34 Latvia 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 75.42 1 0.2 NA 0.2 119.19 0.88 0.0351 0.74 1 1 14570 0 −1.60944 4.780719 −3.34955 9.58672
35 Lebanon 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 65.11 0 0.17 NA 0.17 72.61 5.18 0.0815 0.32 2 3 7980 0 −1.77196 4.285103 −2.50715 8.984694
NORTH AFRICA
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36 Malawi 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 46.24 1 0.75 NA 0.75 77.91 5.99 0.0526 0.4 2 3 320 0 −0.28768 4.355554 −2.94504 5.768321
AFRICA
37 Mauritania 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 50.6 1 1.06 1.06 2.15 100.53 5.72 0.1074 0.16 3 3 1130 0 0.058269 4.610456 −2.2312 7.029973
AFRICA
38 Mauritania 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 51.1 1 2.15 1.06 2.15 100.53 5.72 0.1074 0.16 3 3 1130 0 0.765468 4.610456 −2.2312 7.029973
AFRICA
39 Mexico 2016 AMERICAS 0 0 0 71.49 1 0.3 0.3 0.27 76.22 3.29 0.0263 0.48 4 2 9040 0 −1.20397 4.333624 −3.63819 9.109414
40 Mexico 2018 AMERICAS 0 0 0 70.46 1 0.27 0.3 0.27 76.22 3.29 0.0263 0.48 4 2 9040 0 −1.30933 4.333624 −3.63819 9.109414
41 Mongolia 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 64.09 1 1.24 NA 1.24 95.64 −37.17 0.1161 0.51 3 2 3590 0 0.215111 4.560591 −2.1533 8.185907
42 Morocco 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 67.01 1 0.24 NA 0.24 80.42 2.24 0.0269 0.25 3 2 2850 0 −1.42712 4.387263 −3.61563 7.955074
NORTH AFRICA
43 Myanmar 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 43.57 1 0.96 0.96 1.1 39.06 5.18 0.0378 0.27 5 5 1190 1 −0.04082 3.665099 −3.27545 7.081708
44 Myanmar 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 39.8 1 1.1 0.96 1.1 39.06 5.18 0.0378 0.27 5 5 1190 1 0.09531 3.665099 −3.27545 7.081708
45 Nepal 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 47.55 1 0.82 0.82 0.6 48.88 0.5 0.0034 0.45 3 3 730 0 −0.19845 3.889368 −5.68398 6.593045
46 Nepal 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 45.59 1 0.6 0.82 0.6 48.88 0.5 0.0034 0.45 3 3 730 0 −0.51083 3.889368 −5.68398 6.593045
47 Nigeria 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 54.39 0 0.48 0.48 0.76 20.72 1.1 0.0152 0.47 5 4 2450 1 −0.73397 3.031099 −4.18646 7.803843
AFRICA
48 Nigeria 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 54.93 0 0.76 0.48 0.76 20.72 1.1 0.0152 0.47 5 4 2450 1 −0.27444 3.031099 −4.18646 7.803843
AFRICA
49 Pakistan 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 53.53 0 1.13 1.13 1.68 25.31 0.89 0.0117 0.27 4 4 1500 1 0.122218 3.2312 −4.44817 7.313221
50 Pakistan 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 51.7 0 1.68 1.13 1.68 25.31 0.89 0.0117 0.27 4 4 1500 1 0.518794 3.2312 −4.44817 7.313221
51 Philippines 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 66.97 1 0.4 0.4 0.77 64.9 2.72 0.0155 0.38 5 5 3580 1 −0.91629 4.172848 −4.16692 8.183118
52 Philippines 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 64.08 1 0.77 0.4 0.77 64.9 2.72 0.0155 0.38 5 5 3580 1 −0.26136 4.172848 −4.16692 8.183118
53 Poland 2016 EUROPE 0 0 0 81.2 2 0.48 0.48 0.21 100.47 3.55 0.0308 0.57 2 1 12690 0 −0.73397 4.609859 −3.48024 9.448569
54 Poland 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 78.72 2 0.21 0.48 0.21 100.47 3.55 0.0308 0.57 2 1 12690 0 −1.56065 4.609859 −3.48024 9.448569
55 Romania 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 77.88 1 0.35 NA 0.35 83.57 3.33 0.0301 0.65 2 2 9480 0 −1.04982 4.425684 −3.50323 9.15694
56 Russia 2016 RUSSIA AND 0 0 1 72.29 0 0.73 0.73 0.53 46.23 2.53 0.0263 0.12 4 4 9720 1 −0.31471 3.833629 −3.63819 9.181941
EURASIA
57 Russia 2018 RUSSIA AND 0 0 1 69.06 0 0.53 0.73 0.53 46.23 2.53 0.0263 0.12 4 4 9720 1 −0.63488 3.833629 −3.63819 9.181941
EURASIA
58 Serbia 2018 EUROPE 0 0 0 75.28 1 0.16 NA 0.16 107.5 6.15 0.0662 0.35 1 2 5310 0 −1.83258 4.677491 −2.71507 8.577347
59 Singapore 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 80.01 1 0.34 NA 0.34 310.26 23.97 0.2014 0.34 2 1 51880 0 −1.07881 5.737411 −1.60246 10.85669
60 South Africa 2016 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 69.89 1 0.45 0.45 0.28 60.79 0.75 0.016 0.61 3 4 5490 0 −0.79851 4.107425 −4.13517 8.610683
AFRICA
61 South Africa 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 68.63 1 0.28 0.45 0.28 60.79 0.75 0.016 0.61 3 4 5490 0 −1.27297 4.107425 −4.13517 8.610683
AFRICA
62 Sri Lanka 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 58.92 1 0.22 0.22 0.21 50.01 1.1 0.0121 0.5 3 3 3780 0 −1.51413 3.912223 −4.41455 8.237479
63 Sri Lanka 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 54.45 1 0.21 0.22 0.21 50.01 1.1 0.0121 0.5 3 3 3780 0 −1.56065 3.912223 −4.41455 8.237479
64 Thailand 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 68.15 0 0.89 NA 0.89 121.66 0.74 0.0241 0.11 3 3 5640 1 −0.11653 4.80123 −3.72554 8.637639
65 Tunisia 2016 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 67.3 1 0.77 0.77 0.22 91.44 1.48 0.0286 0.66 3 3 3690 0 −0.26136 4.515683 −3.55435 8.213382
NORTH AFRICA
66 Tunisia 2018 MIDDLE EAST AND 0 0 0 64.86 1 0.22 0.77 0.22 91.44 1.48 0.0286 0.66 3 3 3690 0 −1.51413 4.515683 −3.55435 8.213382
NORTH AFRICA
67 Uganda 2018 SUBSAHARAN 0 1 0 52.66 0 0.76 NA 0.76 47.22 2.6 0.0404 0.28 3 3 630 1 −0.27444 3.854818 −3.20893 6.44572
AFRICA
68 Ukraine 2018 RUSSIA AND 0 0 1 70.6 0 0.67 NA 0.67 104.81 3.69 0.0419 0.22 4 4 2310 1 −0.40048 4.652149 −3.17247 7.745003
EURASIA
69 Vietnam 2016 ASIA 1 0 0 64.27 0 0.15 0.15 0.45 184.69 6.14 0.0624 0.2 3 3 2100 0 −1.89712 5.218679 −2.77419 7.649693
70 Vietnam 2018 ASIA 1 0 0 59.7 0 0.45 0.15 0.45 184.69 6.14 0.0624 0.2 3 3 2100 0 −0.79851 5.218679 −2.77419 7.649693
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